Denver Law Review
Volume 68
Issue 4 Tenth Circuit Surveys

Article 21

January 1991

Courts & (and) Procedure
Denver University Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Denver University Law Review, Courts & (and) Procedure, 68 Denv. U. L. Rev. 585 (1991).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

COURTS & PROCEDURE

Abels v. Kaiser, 913 F.2d 821
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Abels, petitioned the district court for habeas corpus relief. In his petition, Abels argued that his constitutional right to appeal
his state court conviction was denied for two reasons. First, Abels
claimed that his counsel refused to proceed on appeal because Abels
was essentially indigent and not able to afford his attorney's legal services. Second, the state refused, after a finding that Abels was not indigent, to provide him with appointed counsel. The district court denied
Abels's petition and he subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit first rejected Abels's argument that he was denied his right to appeal because his counsel refused to proceed. The
court explained that the record contained insufficient evidence to overturn the district court's ruling that Abels was not indigent at the time of
his conviction. Second, the court stated that Abels's constitutional right
to effective assistance of counsel was violated. The court explained that
Abels's counsel did not properly file a motion to withdraw as counsel.
Thus, Abels's counsel was not relieved of his duties to perfect the appeal. Accordingly, the counselor's failure to file an appellate brief violated Abels's constitutional right to effective counsel. Thus, the case was
remanded to provide Abels with assistance of counsel.
United States v. Anderson, 906 F.2d 1485
Author: Judge McKay
Defendants are realtors who represent four clients. These clients
are allegedly involved in an organization suspected of engaging in illegal
drug activity. The realtors were held in contempt of court because they
refused to reveal the source of fees incurred during their representation
of the clients. The realtors filed an emergency appeal, alleging that the
fee information was subject to attorney-client privilege, that it infringed
on their sixth amendment right to counsel, and that the government
failed to make the necessary showing of need. The realtors also claimed
that the district court's proceedings violated their due process rights.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court, except
to the extent that it required the disclosure of the fee contracts. The
court explained that the source of payment for legal fees is not generally
protected by attorney-client privilege and the three major exceptions to
the rule were not applicable. The court further explained that although
the clients have a right to counsel on appeal, there is no evidence showing resulting conflict between the realtors and the clients. The court
recognized that the government was required only to provide notice to
the subpoenaed witnesses and to show that the information is relevant
to a legitimate grand jury investigation; the government met that stan-
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dard. The court ruled that the procedures used did not violate due process, and that the sentence imposed was not an abuse of discretion.
Becenti v. Vigil, 902 F.2d 777
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Becenti, brought suit in tribal court over the handling of a
loan by two employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The government
removed the action to district court, then sought to dismiss. The district
court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds. Becenti appealed, arguing removal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442 was improper since the statute provides for removal only from
state courts.
The Tenth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded
to the district court for remand to tribal court. The court concluded
that Congress has always used express language when permitting removal from courts other than state courts. Since § 1442 refers only to
"state" courts, it did not apply to actions filed in tribal court.
Bonin v. Tour West, Inc., 896 F.2d 1260
Per Curiam
Plaintiffs, Andrew and Richard Bonin, brought a personal injury action against defendant, Tour West, Inc. ("Tour West"). The district
court entered judgment in favor of Tour West based on jury responses
to a special verdict. The Bonins appealed, arguing that the district court
erred in refusing to grant a new trial when the jury gave inconsistent
answers on the special verdicts.
The Tenth Circuit, under an abuse of discretion standard, reversed
the decision of the district court. The court reasoned that answers to
questions on a special verdict must be read together. On the verdict
form, the jury found Tour West not negligent, but also attributed a portion of the negligence to Tour West. Accordingly, when read together,
the court found the inconsistencies irreconcilable and ordered a new
trial.
United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, United States, appealed the district court's dismissal of its
case against two juvenile Indian defendants for the murder of a nonIndian and the assault of an Indian. The district court held that since
the government did not provide required documents relating to prior
juvenile court proceedings, the government failed to properly invoke jurisdiction under the federal juvenile statute.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal without
prejudice. The court found that the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5032, clearly states that proceedings begin
with the filing of information. Accordingly, since the government failed
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to provide the district court with prior juvenile records, the action was
properly dismissed.
United States v. Clark, 901 F.2d 855
Author: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Clark, pleaded guilty to embezzlement and was ordered
to pay restitution in the amount of $153,762 pursuant to the Victim and
Witness Protection Act ("VWPA"), 18 U.S.C. § 3663-64. Clark appealed, claiming that the district court failed to consider her financial
status, as required by the VWPA, when imposing restitution.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion
by ordering Clark to pay $153,762 immediately. A restitution order
must be consistent with the defendant's ability to pay. The court found
nothing in the record to support the district court's finding. Accordingly, the restitution order was vacated.
United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424
Author: Judge Logan
In the original action filed by plaintiff, United Nuclear Corporation,
in 1985, the district court entered a protective order regarding discovery. After the parties settled in 1986, the same court sealed the record.
Parties in collateral suits against defendant, Cranford Insurance Company ("Cranford"), sought to intervene in 1989, seeking access to the
discovery for use in their actions in other courts. The district court
granted permissive intervention and modified its prior orders to allow
access to the intervenors. Cranford subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. First,
the court stated that permissive intervention is a matter within the sound
discretion of the district court and will not be overturned without a
showing of clear abuse. The correct procedure of non-parties challenging a protective order is through intervention for that purpose. When
intervention is sought to gain access to discovery subject to a protective
order, no strong nexus of fact or law need exist between the two suits.
Second, the court upheld the modification of the protective order. The
court compared the confidentiality needs of the parties in the original
suit against the need for avoiding duplicative discovery in the collateral
case. If denial of litigation would place litigants in a position needing to
perform repetitive discovery, then the order could be denied. But, there
must be a showing of prejudice to the substantial rights of the party
opposing modification. Cranford's desire to make it more burdensome
for intervenors to pursue their collateral litigation was not legitimate
prejudice.
Dodson v. Zelez, 917 F.2d 1250
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, Dodson, a Marine, appealed the district court's denial of
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his petition for habeas corpus relief. On appeal, Dodson argued that:
(1) the voting procedure of the court martial violated due process;
(2) the composition of the court martial violated due process; (3) he
was denied a speedy trial; and (4) the exclusion of expert testimony violated due process.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's refusal to review
Dodson's second, third and fourth arguments. The court stated that
these claims were fully and fairly considered by the military courts and,
therefore, not subject to federal court review. The court reversed the
district court's denial of habeas corpus relief, however, holding that the
writ should be issued because the court-martial's voting procedure violated due process. Specifically, the court held that the court martial
failed to require a three-fourths vote in favor of the life sentence imposed. The three-fourths requirement was mandated by the Manual for
Courts-Martial.
Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572
Author: Judge Ebel
After being arrested by defendant, police officer Donges, plaintiff,
Stewart, brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Donges sought and was
denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district
court then denied Donges's request for a stay pending appeal of its ruling on the motion. He subsequently filed an interlocutory notice of appeal with the Tenth Circuit. After trial resulted in a jury verdict for
Stewart, Donges appealed.
The Tenth Circuit vacated the verdict. The court held that in an
interlocutory appeal concerning summary judgment and qualified immunity of a public official, the central issue is the defendant's right not
to have to proceed to trial. If the qualified immunity defense is held
valid, no part of the trial may continue. Therefore, once Donges filed
his interlocutory appeal, and the district court did not certify the appeal
as frivolous and without merit, the district court lost jurisdiction to proceed with the action until the appeal was decided. Thus, the resultant
trial commenced without jurisdiction. Accordingly, the court vacated
the trial, holding it was a nullity.
United States v. Elliott, 915 F.2d 1455
Author: Judge McWilliams
Plaintiff, Elliott, was convicted of willfully taking by force, violence,
and intimidation, currency from a bank. He was sentenced to 210
months of imprisonment. Elliott appealed, contending that his conviction should be reversed based on: (1) improper remarks made by the
prosecutor in closing argument regarding Elliott's failure to testify; and
(2) the in-court identification of Elliott was improper because the bank
teller previously saw a photograph of Elliott in the local newspaper. Elliott also appealed his sentence, arguing that the court failed to state its
reasons for imposing the maximum term.
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The Tenth Circuit affirmed Elliott's conviction. First, the prosecutor's closing argument was appropriate since it was solicited from someone other than Elliott. Second, the bank teller's positive identification
of Elliott was not impermissibly influenced by the fact that she saw a
fifteen year old photograph in a local newspaper. The court explained
that the teller stated the photograph did not resemble Elliott. Moreover, the teller made a positive identification in a recent photo lineup.
Furthermore, she assisted in preparing a composite drawing prior to
seeing the photographs. Third, the court remanded the case for resentencing. The court reasoned that the district court failed to state its reasons for imposing the maximum sentence. In essence, a sentencing
court must state why it imposed a sentence at a particular point within
the Sentencing Guidelines range.
Ellis v. Consolidated Diesel Elec. Corp., 894 F.2d 371
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Ellis, brought suit alleging personal injury due to a vehicle
defectively designed and manufactured by defendants, Consolidated
Diesel Electric Corporation, Vought Corporation, and LTV Corporation. The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment during a period in which the bankruptcy court issued an automatic
stay. This stay prevented all entities from commencing or continuing
any judicial proceeding against any of the debtors. Ellis appealed,
claiming that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter summary
judgment.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal, explaining that there was
no final judgment from which to appeal. The court held that a stay in
judicial proceedings by the bankruptcy court renders a district court's
action void, even if judgment were entered in favor of the debtor. The
court concluded that once it held the district court opinion void, it no
longer had jurisdiction over the appeal.
United States v. Gomez-Olivas, 897 F.2d 500
Author: Judge Logan
Defendant, Gomez-Olivas, was convicted of possessing with intent
to distribute and importing a controlled substance. Gomez-Olivas appealed, alleging: (1) that the district court's "no-adverse-inference" jury
instruction was insufficient because it did not contain a statement on
compulsion; and (2) certain closing argument comments made by the
prosecutor were improper.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling. First, the
court stated that the district court did not err in failing to contain a statement on compulsion in the no-adverse-inference instruction. The court
explained that Gomez-Olivas did not request the district judge to include the compulsion aspect in the instruction. Instead, at trial GomezOlivas only objected to the wording of the instruction. Second, the
prosecutor's comments were entirely proper. The court explained that
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as long as evidence can be solicited from someone other than the accused, it is proper to comment upon the defense's failure to produce it.
Moreover, lack of corroboration is a permissible inference to argue. Finally, Gomez-Olivas's argument that the comments were improper because they were made during rebuttal, when defense counsel could no
longer respond, was without merit.
United States v. Harmon, 918 F.2d 115
Author: Judge Seth
Defendant, Harmon, was convicted of aiding and abetting Thomas
in the distribution of cocaine. On appeal, Harmon contended that his
due process rights were violated when the district court allowed the government to introduce false testimony through Thomas. Harmon also
alleged that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed
Thomas to testify concerning his prior transportation of cocaine for
Harmon. He asserted that the district court failed to balance the probative value of Thomas's uncorroborated testimony against its prejudicial
impact.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. First, the
court stated that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Thomas's testimony. The court explained that Harmon did not
prove that the government knowingly presented false testimony to the
jury. The government offered both Officer Dyer's and Thomas's testimony. The competing testimony established a factual dispute as to
whose story was most credible, and the district court properly presented
that issue to the jury for its determination. Second, the court noted that
once a court determines that prior crimes or wrong acts are admissable
under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), it is then required to balance the probative
value of the evidence against prejudice to the defendant under Fed. R.
Evid. 403. The court found that the record supported the district
court's procedure and determination that the probative value of Harmon's bad acts outweighed the prejudicial effect.
Held v. Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corp., 912 F.2d 1197
Author: Judge Brorby
Dissent: Judge Ebel
Plaintiff, Held, a domiciliary of Colorado, was employed by defendant, Manufacturers Hanover Leasing Corporation ("Hanover"), a New
York corporation, for almost ten years. One day he was told that he
would not be reassigned. Held, therefore, tendered his resignation,
which took effect one month before the vesting date of his pension benefits. Four years later, he brought suit against Hanover, claiming that he
was forced to resign so that he would be precluded from obtaining his
full pension benefits. Held argued that this was in violation of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). The district
court granted Hanover summary judgment on the ground that Held's
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claim was barred by New York's three-year statute of limitations. Held
subsequently appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling in part, and
reversed in part. The court found that Held had two distinct causes of
action: an action for injunctive relief for unlawful discharge and an action at law to recover benefits under the terms of his retirement plan.
Noting that ERISA provided no applicable statute of limitations, the
court ruled that New York law governed the limitation of Held's claims.
The court reasoned that New York's relationship to the litigation was
more significant than that of the forum state, Colorado. Accordingly,
the court ruled that the equitable claim was time-barred because the
claim was "most analogous" to an employment discrimination claim
under New York state law. Thus, it was subject to a three-year statute of
limitations. The court stated that the legal claim under the pension plan
was not barred because it was subject to New York's six-year statute of
limitations governing contracts.
United States v. Hernandez-Garcia, 901 F.2d 875
Author: Judge McWilliams
Defendant Hernandez-Garcia was convicted on three counts of
transporting illegal aliens. At trial, there was confusion regarding a jury
instruction. Consequently, the judge gave the jury an Allen instruction
which stated that if a unanimous verdict was not reached, HernandezGarcia must be tried again. Hernandez-Garcia failed to object. After
the jury returned a guilty verdict, the court polled the jurors. One juror
did not affirm his verdict until asked a fifth time. Hernandez-Garcia appealed, asserting that there was coercion when the district court gave
the Allen instruction and when it polled the jury.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction. Trial counsel did not
object to the Allen instruction, so review was under the plain error standard. The court reasoned that although use of the word "may" instead
of "must" would be preferable, use of the latter was not reversible error.
The polling of the jurors in the courtroom was also not coercive. Ifjurors give an uncertain response when polled, the district judge should
try to resolve the uncertainty. Here, the district judge conducted what
the court considered to be a limited inquiry during which the juror had
an opportunity to deny the verdict but did not.
United States v. Hickok, 907 F.2d 983
Author: Judge Brorby
Defendant, Hickok, appealed the district court's order denying his
motion to withdraw a plea of guilty to one of three drug charges.
Hickok claimed that his plea was entered into as a result of ignorance
and fear. Accordingly, Hickok contended that the district court abused
its discretion when it refused to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea
because: (1) he was entitled to have a jury determine his guilt or innocence; (2) the government would not be prejudiced by a withdrawal of
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his plea; and (3) the district court improperly considered evidence of his
guilt or innocence in refusing his motion.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not
abuse its discretion. First, the court explained that Hickok waived his
fundamental right to a jury with his plea of guilty. Second, the court
ruled that Hickok bore the burden of persuasion, so the government
need not prove prejudice. Third, guilt or innocence of the defendant is
not one of the criteria used in determining whether to grant the motion.
Moreover, Hickok failed to show "fair and just reason" for withdrawal of
his guilty plea.
Hunter v. New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595
Per Curiam
Defendant, Hunter, was convicted on one count of first degree
criminal sexual penetration ("CSP") and two counts of second degree
CSP. Hunter petitioned the court for habeas corpus relief, which was subsequently denied. He appealed, alleging that: (1) his due process
rights were violated by a fatal variance between the information filed
against him and ajury instruction; (2) a lack of specificity as to the dates
of the alleged crimes violated his due process rights; and (3) he was
denied effective assistance of counsel.
The Tenth Circuit found a fatal variance between the information
filed and the jury instructions. The court explained that the jury was
allowed to convict Hunter upon a factual basis that modified an essential
element of the offense charged. Specifically, Hunter was charged with
CSP between January 1, 1974, and October 23, 1977. But, prior to June
1975, first degree CSP did not exist in New Mexico. Instead, the activities that now give rise to CSP were considered a fourth degree offense
from January 1974, through June 1975. Thus, in submitting an erroneous jury instruction, the court allowed the jury to convict Hunter of first
degree CSP on evidence of digital penetration prior to June 1975. Because this was not a simple variance but instead a fatal one, the court
reversed the district court's determination. Furthermore, the court
found unpersuasive Hunter's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Also, the court rejected Hunter's argument that his due process rights
were violated because the district court failed to specify the dates of the
alleged crimes.
United States v. Ibarra, 920 F.2d 702
Author: Judge McKay
Dissent: Judge Baldock
Defendant, Ibarra, was indicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Ibarra moved to suppress statements made after his
arrest and evidence obtained in several searches of his automobile. Specifically, Ibarra argued that his consent to the vehicle search was made
under duress. The government eventually conceded that Ibarra did not
consent to the search. Consequently, the district court granted Ibarra's
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motion to suppress. The government subsequently moved for reconsideration of the suppression order. After the district court denied reconsideration, the government filed a notice of appeal. Ibarra contested the
Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction to hear the appeal, arguing that the notice of
appeal was untimely under rule 4(b) of the Fed. R. App. P. The government contended that its filing for reconsideration tolled the thirty-day
statutory limit for filing notice of appeal.
The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that the government's notice was untimely filed and that the court, therefore, lacked
jurisdiction to review the district court's order. The court reasoned that
a motion for reconsideration of a previously conceded issue is unlikely
to succeed. Moreover, it merely serves to prolong the process of litigation. Accordingly, the court concluded that allowing such a motion to
toll the time for filing a notice of appeal would subvert the concern for
judicial economy. The court, therefore, did not reach the merits of the
government's claims.
United States v. Lowden, 900 F.2d 213
Author: Judge Anderson
Defendant, Lowden, was convicted of assault on Indian land.
Lowden was subsequently sentenced to thirty months incarceration. He
appealed his eonviction, contending that the prosecutor's rebuttal and
closing argument were improper. Allegedly, certain remarks made by
the prosecutor implied that Lowden's defense counsel thought he was
guilty. Moreover, Lowden claimed that the prosecutor improperly accused defense counsel of referring to facts not in evidence. In addition,
Lowden argued that during sentencing, there should have been a downward departure.
After considering the trial transcripts, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that the remarks made by the prosecutor were not prejudicial and did
not influence the jury to render the conviction on improper grounds.
Second, the court concluded that the district court's reasoning to not
depart downward was ambiguous. Accordingly, the court transmitted
the opinion to the district court with a request. This request asked the
district court to state whether it thought it had the power to depart
downward.
Monk v. Zelez, 901 F.2d 885
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Monk, was convicted in a general court-martial of murdering his wife. He appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, asserting that his conviction was obtained in violation of his constitutional right to due process of law. Monk reasoned that the military
judge's reasonable doubt instruction impermissibly lessened the prosecution's burden of proof. In particular, the military judge erred in
equating "reasonable doubt" with "substantial doubt." Also, Monk alleged the judge erred in his instructions to the court martial members.
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He erred by stating that no reasonable doubt exists if they would be
"willing to act" on their belief in Monk's guilt to the same extent as they
would be willing to act on a belief concerning an important personal
matter.
The Tenth Circuit first stated that its review of military convictions
is limited to jurisdictional issues and to determinations of whether the
military has given fair consideration to a defendant's constitutional
claims. The court found that the Military Court of Appeals considered
monk's claim. The court nonetheless stated that Monk's claim was subject to further review because it was substantial and largely free of factual questions. The court next ruled that the military judge's reasonable
doubt instruction was defective. The court explained that appellate
courts have uniformly criticized and rejected jury instructions equating
"reasonable doubt" with "substantial doubt." Moreover, the "willingness to act" language identified by Monk has also been criticized. Thus,
the court held this language to be constitutionally defective. The court
then ruled that this language so affected Monk's court martial that his
conviction violated due process. The court reasoned that the reasonable doubt instruction diluted the burden of proof the prosecution was
required to meet. Thus, the court granted his writ for habeas corpus
relief.
United States v. Moralez, 917 F.2d 18
Author: Judge Moore
Defendant, Moralez, appealed his conviction. Specifically, Moralez
claimed that the district court erred in not disclosing a "confidential witness." The Tenth Circuit remanded for findings consistent with the balancing test required by Rovarro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957). On
remand, the district court found that: (1) the government demonstrated
a need to protect the witness in light of the person's fear of retaliation
and physical harm; and (2) the person was a "mere tipster." Moralez
appealed, reasserting that the person was a potential eyewitness who
could aid his defense with exculpatory evidence.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order against
Moralez. The court held that disclosure of the witness was not required
because the testimony would be cumulative. Moreover, the person
neither participated in nor witnessed the crime.
Nelson v. Carlson, 904 F.2d 560
Per Curiam
Plaintiff, Nelson, argued that detainers placed on him by the state of
Arizona violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act ("IADA").
Nelson subsequently motioned for permanent injunctive relief against
defendant, Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The district court
denied the motion, and Nelson appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that Nelson's motion for permanent injunc-
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tive relief could not be brought under IADA in a federal court. The
court found that although some circumstances may allow a federal court
to grant relief from a state detainer, such circumstances were not present. The court did not reach the question of whether IADA was violated, but held only that the purpose of IADA and principles of comity
required that such a determination be made by the Arizona state courts.
The district court's order was vacated insofar as it constituted a ruling
on the merits, and the cause was remanded to the district court with
instructions to dismiss the proceedings.
United States v. Novak, 918 F.2d 107
Author: Judge Seth
Defendant, Novak, was convicted for possession with intent to distribute cocaine. In opening argument, the government made references
to evidence of Novak's intent to distribute and references to the cocaine's purity. The prosecutor failed to introduce evidence at trial supporting these claims. Novak appealed his conviction, alleging that the
district court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after the prosecutor failed to substantiate factual statements made during opening
argument.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of mistrial and
remanded. In determining whether the government's failure to support
statements made during opening argument should result in a mistrial,
the court examined the prosecutor's good faith and the statement's impact. Finding that the prosecutor should have been aware of hearsay
problems in his statements, the court held that the prosecutor exceeded
the permissible scope of an opening statement. The court also found
that the prosecution's opening statements regarding the cocaine's purity
were not supported by the evidence at trial and, thus, exceeded the
scope of the opening statement. Absent a showing of prejudice to the
defendant, prosecutorial misconduct alone is insufficient to establish
that a district court abused its discretion. The court found, however,
that since the remainder of the prosecution's case was completely circumstantial, the unsubstantiated opening statements caused extensive
prejudice to Novak. Moreover, such prejudice was not cured by the district court's jury instruction that opening statements are not evidence.
Accordingly, on this basis the court held that Novak's motion for a mistrial should be granted.
Post Office v. Portec, Inc., 913 F.2d 802
Author: Judge McKay
Plaintiff, the Post Office, brought suit against defendant, Portec Inc.
("Portec") for manufacturing an identical package handling chute. The
jury awarded actual damages of $79,519.40 for the misappropriation of
trade secrets and breach of fiduciary duty. The jury also awarded
$1,500,000.00 in punitive damages. Additionally, the district court
awarded $619,315.24 in attorney fees and costs. Portec appealed, argu-
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ing that: (1) it was prejudiced by not having the list of trade secrets allegedly misappropriated until trial; (2) the district court failed to submit
a jury instruction; (3) the testimony of an expert witness was prejudicial;
(4) punitive damages were improper because no actual damages were
awarded by the jury for those claims upon which punitive damages
would be appropriate; (5) Colorado's punitive damages statute is unconstitutional; (6) the punitive damages award was excessive; (7) the attorney's fees were inappropriate; and (8) the injunction prohibiting
future manufacturing of chutes was too broad.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment with two
exceptions. First, the court stated it was precluded from the issue of
prejudice because it found no manifest error. Second, its review of the
jury instruction was precluded because Portec did not object to it at
trial. Third, the expert's testimony was beyond the court's review because Portec, once again, did not object to it at trial. Fourth, the language of the special interrogatories combined with the language of the
jury instruction provided a sufficient basis to uphold the jury's punitive
damage award. Fifth, Colorado's punitive statute is constitutional.
Sixth, the punitive damages award was so excessive that it shocked the
judicial conscience. Accordingly, the court ordered a remittitur. The
court based its decision on the ratio of punitive to actual damages,
Portec's economic status, and the deterrent effect of the award. Seventh, the court remanded to the district court an order to reduce the
amount of attorney expenses by twenty percent. The court reasoned
that attorney fees should only be apportioned to each claim sustained.
Eighth, the district court did not abuse its discretion in prohibiting
Portec from selling spiral chutes. Without this prohibition, the court
reasoned there would be enforcement problems.
Rainbow Travel Serv., Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 896 F.2d 1233
Author: Judge Brown, sitting by designation
Plaintiff, Rainbow Travel Service Inc. ("Rainbow") brought suit
against defendant, Hilton Hotels, Inc. ("Hilton"), based on breach of
contract and fraud. Hilton moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the district court denied the motion. Hilton subsequently
appealed the denial of his motion. Hilton also alleged that the district
court erred by admitting certain evidence and by submitting improper
jury instructions.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's assertion of personal
jurisdiction over Hilton and its decision to submit the damage and fraud
issues to the jury. While the court noted that the formation of an out-ofstate contract, in itself, is not enough to establish jurisdiction over an
out-of-state party, Hilton previously engaged in activities purposefully
directed at Oklahoma residents. This was sufficient to justify the assertion of personal jurisdiction. The activities included soliciting business
in Oklahoma, as well as negotiating the contract with Rainbow, and demanding partial performance by Rainbow in Oklahoma. In addition, the
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court found sufficient evidence to support the jury's award of damages
for goodwill and its verdict on fraud, but not its award of damages for
breach of contract. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's admission of letters and other testimony by dissatisfied
customers.
Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124
Author: Judge Seymour
Plaintiff, Reynoldson, a pro se prisoner, claimed his due process
rights were violated when inmates were: (1) placed into an adjustment
block of the Wyoming State Prison without a hearing; and (2) denied
access to personal possessions without a hearing. The district court dismissed, with prejudice, Reynoldson's complaint for injunctive relief.
The district court reasoned that Reynoldson failed to allege that he,
himself, was wronged. Moreover, the court noted that Reynoldson's allegations were overly broad and conclusory. Reynoldson subsequently
appealed. He also appealed the district court's ruling that he could not
proceed in forma pauperis.
The Tenth Circuit stated that Reynoldson's complaint concerned
inmates rather than the plaintiff himself. A broad reading of the complaint, however, supported the conclusion that Reynoldson was put into
the special block without due process. Thus, the court stated that its
permissive interpretation accorded with the well-settled principle that
pro se prisoner complaints must be construed liberally. Accordingly, the
district court erred in dismissing Reynoldson's complaint with prejudice. Moreover, the court took issue with the district court's dismissal
on the basis of vagueness. Consequently, the court stated that Reynoldson should be given the opportunity to file an amended complaint. The
court, therefore, granted leave to proceed in forna pauperis.
United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462
Author: Judge Ebel
Defendant, Rivera, was convicted of thirteen drug-related offenses.
Rivera appealed, contending he did not receive adequate representation. Moreover, he argued that the district court's refusal to grant a continuance constituted cumulative error. A divided Tenth Circuit panel
reversed, finding that the combination of Rivera's claims plus the introduction of evidence not specifically presented before the grand jury,
constituted reversible error.
The Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed. After reviewing the cumulative-error doctrine, the court found no error in either the performance of Rivera's counsel or the denial of a continuance. The challenge
concerning the new evidence was not before the court, having been rejected by a previous en banc review. The court remanded with instructions to vacate two lesser-included convictions.
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Shafer v. Stratton, 906 F.2d 506
Author: Judge Anderson
Plaintiff, Shafer, was convicted in state court of securities violations
under state law. Shafer petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court, which was denied with prejudice. Shafer appealed, contending that his writ of habeas corpus in federal court should have been
granted because: (1) the state trail court refusal to instruct the jury regarding his theory of the case was a denial of due process and a fair trial;
(2) the state trial court restricted his cross-examination of a prosecution
witness, thereby violating his sixth amendment rights; and (3) the
prison sentences imposed were excessive, thus violating due process.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas
corpus. The court explained that the New Mexico trial court did not err
when it refused to give Shafer's jury instructions. The court reasoned
that the refusal did not render the trial fundamentally unfair nor did it
deny Shafer's right to due process. Since the trial was not fundamentally unfair, habeas corpus proceedings could not be used to set aside the
judgment. The court also ruled that Shafer failed to show cause and
prejudice regarding his failure to cross-examine a prosecution witness.
Coupled with procedural default, he was not entitled to federal habeas
corpus review. Finally, Shafer's sentencing was concerned solely with
matters of state law and thus failed to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254.
Slane v. Jery Scott Drilling Co., 918 F.2d 123
Author: Judge Barrett
Plaintiffs, Richard and Linda Slane, brought suit against defendant,
Jerry Scott Drilling Company ("Scott"), Tuney Burger, Inc. ("Burger"),
and Tuney Bruger, individually. The Slanes initiated the action after
Richard was severely burned following an explosion on an oil drilling rig
where he was employed. Scott was a drilling contractor, and Burger was
its consultant and on-site supervisor. The district court found in favor
of the defendants, and the Slanes appealed. Specifically, the Slanes contended that: (1) the sudden emergency instruction misled the jury;
(2) the district court erred in giving an assumption of risk instruction;
and (3) Burger's counsel committed reversible error by introducing extraneous matters during his closing argument.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the district court's instruction on sudden emergency was error. The court reasoned that the instruction improperly applied to all defendants when only one of them pleaded it.
Moreover, the instruction misstated Oklahoma law because it failed to
inform the jury that the defense was not available to a party who created
the emergency. Second, the district court did not err in giving an assumption of the risk instruction. The court reasoned that the evidence
showed that Richard was imminently aware of the inherent dangers in
the oil field and uniquely aware of the dangers of a drill stem test.
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Third, although defense counsel's comments during closing arguments
were improper, the court declined to reverse. The court explained that
the prejudice to the Slanes, if any, was minimal.
United States v. Thompson, 908 F.2d 648
Author: Judge McKay
Defendant, Thompson, was convicted of defrauding the government in real estate purchases financed with mortgages insured by the
Federal Housing Administration. Thompson appealed the district
court's denial of his motion for a new trial. Thompson argued that the
district court erred in expressly refusing to voir dire the jury on their
exposure to a newspaper article which discussed a previous guilty plea
signed by Thompson. This plea was withdrawn before trial.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and
remanded the case for a new trial. The court ruled that the article was
prejudicial because it contained information addressing the issue of
guilt. Consequently, the district court's refusal to voir dire the jury, or at
a minimum to ask whether the jurors had read the article, was an abuse
of discretion. The court then determined that the error was not harmless. The government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
knowledge of the prior guilty plea did not enter into the jury's
evaluation.
Certain Underwritersat Lloyds of London v. Evans, 896 F.2d 1255
Author: Judge Seth
Two related cases were decided. The first case involved a jurisdictional question. Defendant, Hamm, motioned for enlargement of time
in order to file a notice of appeal fifty-nine days after the filing deadline.
The district court granted a twenty-one day extension. Plaintiff, Certain
Underwriters at Lloyds of London ("underwriters"), appealed, asserting
that the extension exceeded that allowed by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ("FRAP"). Thus, the underwriters argued that the Tenth
Circuit was without jurisdiction.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court and dismissed the
appeal. The court reasoned that it lacked jurisdiction because Hamm
failed to timely file his notice of appeal. Under FRAP, the maximum
extension in this case was ten days, a time limit which the district court
did not have the authority to enlarge.
The second case involved a declaratory judgment action on the
question of insurance coverage. Defendant, Evans, filed a wrongful
death action in state court based upon the decedent's death while riding
in an aircraft connected with a fly-in. The underwriters subsequently
filed in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the death was
not covered by its insurance policy. Summary judgment was issued in
favor of the underwriters based upon exclusionary language in the policy. Evans subsequently appealed.
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The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly
found that the insurance policy excluded passengers riding in an aircraft
used directly in the fly-in. Moreover, the district cour correctly found
that the decedent was a passenger for purposes of the insurance policy.
The court reasoned that the common meaning of the word "passenger"
included someone such as the decedent who rode in the rear of the aircraft without access to the controls. Moreover, the aircraft was actively
flown as part of the fly-in activities and was, thus, used directly in the
event.
United States v. Vidakovich, 911 F.2d 435
Author: Judge McWilliams
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant, Vidakovich, owner of Yellowstone State Bank, pleaded guilty to misapplication of monies, making
false entries in the books and records for purposes of defrauding the
bank, and obstruction of justice. Several months after pleading guilty,
Vidakovich filed a motion to withdraw his plea. Vidakovich claimed that:
(1) his pleas were involuntary and coerced; (2) he had a valid defense to
each of the charges; and (3) the government reached the plea bargain
by asking for a restitution order. The district court denied Vidakovich's
motion.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the transcript of the plea
bargain and determined that the judge who accepted the plea bargain
was "careful and cautious." Second, the district court properly rejected
Vidakovich's testimony that he had a defense to all the counts after originally pleading guilty. Moreover, there was no evidence that the government breached its plea bargain by entering a restitution order, which
was later vacated. Thus, there was no restitution problem which would
require the district court to grant Vidakovich's motion to withdraw his
plea.
United States v. Walker, 915 F.2d 1463
Author: Judge Tacha
Defendant, Walker, appealed her conviction on six counts of mail
fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. On appeal, Walker argued that
acquittal was improperly denied because there was insufficient evidence
to convict her of mail fraud. The government, on the other hand, argued that: (1) the Tenth Circuit lacked jurisdiction because Walker filed
for appeal after her conviction but before sentencing; and (2) Walker
failed to reserve her issue for appeal because she only moved for acquittal at the end of the government's case and did not renew her motion at
the close of all evidence introduced at trial.
The Tenth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction. The court reasoned
that even though Walker's notice of appeal was premature, it was
"harmless error." The notice of appealed ripened after sentencing
when the judgment was formally finalized. When a defendant moves for
acquittal after the government's case, and then presents evidence on de-
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fendant's behalf, the motion for judgment of acquittal is deemed withdrawn, and any objection to its denial is waived. A motion for acquittal
at the close of the government's case, therefore, must be renewed. If
the motion is deemed withdrawn, the court will reverse the district
court's judgment only if there is manifest error and only if reversal is
necessary to prevent a miscarriage ofjustice. The court upheld the conviction, finding no manifest error or miscarriage of justice in the jury's
decision that the U.S. Mails were incident to the defendant's scheme to
defraud her employer.

